Kurt Nicklas
2008-08-26 11:24:03 UTC
Don't Trust Politicians With War
26 August 2008
moscowtimes.ru
Until recently, I thought the famous quip by early 20th-century French
Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau that "war is too important to be
left to the generals" had a lot of validity. Now the South Ossetian
war has shown that even when there is an unquestionable military
victory, diplomats and politicians can turn it into a crushing defeat.
I must admit that for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Russia's army fought well despite the fact that its main
weaponry dates back to the early 1980s. What's more, the army fought
with an extremely outdated communications system and without the use
of drones, night-vision equipment or precision-guided weapons.
The conflict also demonstrated that the military top brass runs the
armed forces the same way they did in the 1970s. Its archaic structure
prevents the military from conducting joint operations between all the
branches of the armed forces under a unified command structure. The
result is that land- and air-based forces operate completely
independent of each other. It is anyone's guess why Tu-22 strategic
bombers were used for reconnaissance purposes or for the strafing of
tactical ground targets. It is also unclear why the Air Force was
unable to foil Georgian anti-aircraft systems using electronic
countermeasures; as a result, Georgia was able to shoot down a few
Russian aircraft. Moreover, military intelligence dropped the ball
when it failed to provide timely reports of Georgian troop deployment.
But at the end of the day, none of these drawbacks stopped Russian
forces from gaining an early decisive victory. And contrary to what is
widely believed, the Russian forces did not have an overwhelming
numerical superiority over the Georgian forces. Rather, Moscow sent a
few units of well-trained and battle-ready volunteers, and they played
a decisive role in the victory since they were deployed into the
battle area without any reorganization or additional mobilization.
Russia began its deployment only 12 hours after Georgia initiated its
first attacks on South Ossetia. That was a good response time,
especially if you compare it to the military's poor performance in the
first and second wars in Chechnya. In the second war, federal forces
finally pulled themselves together and began fighting only 10 days
after insurgent leader Shamil Basayev's army invaded Dagestan.
For the first time, the army conducted its operations using the Powell
Doctrine, named after Colin Powell, then-U.S. Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (although the main points were originally formulated
in the early 1980s by former U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger). According to this doctrine, heavy and decisive force
should be used right away to provide maximum superiority over the
enemy in the shortest time. In addition, it would be difficult for
truly objective military analysts to fault Russian forces for
destroying Georgia's most important military targets deep inside its
territory. These were necessary steps to disrupt Georgia's supply
lines and to prevent regrouping of enemy forces.
But a successful military campaign ended up being a political
catastrophe for Russia, which now finds itself completely isolated by
the international community. The level of isolation is not unlike when
the Soviet Union was ostracized in 1983 after its fighter jets shot
down a South Korean airplane full of passengers. In answer to the
condemnation that Russian has received from all sides, propagandists
on state television ask: "Has Russian done anything wrong? Didn't NATO
send troops into Yugoslavia without a mandate from the international
community? And didn't the United States do the same thing in Iraq?"
The West has never been this united against Moscow's aggressive, neo-
imperial foreign policy. But this has been building up for years,
based largely on the inflammatory rhetoric of Russia's top leaders.
Remember, for example, how then-President Vladimir Putin's repeatedly
threatened the West with "asymmetric" responses -- for example, aiming
the country's missiles at Poland, the Czech Republic and Ukraine in
response to NATO expansion and the planned deployment of elements of a
U.S. missile-defense system in Europe. In addition, there were those
ridiculous media leaks about refueling Russian strategic bombers in
Cuba and the threat from a top military leader to deploy Iskander
missiles in the Kaliningrad region. And don't forget Putin's
incendiary speech in Munich in 2007.
It is particularly noteworthy that only Cuba, Syria, Belarus (albeit
with some hesitation at first) and a few other countries have
supported Russia's military response in Georgia. Neither China nor
India supported the Kremlin, even though Moscow defended their
interests at the most recent Group of Eight summit in Japan. And it is
clear why they remain silent. They have "problem territories" of their
own and intend to retain the right to act as they choose in them
without fear of foreign interference.
To put it bluntly, the Georgian campaign was a complete and total
failure of Russian diplomacy. Moscow's current isolation is the
inevitable result of having developed over the last few years its hard-
nosed, provocative stance against the West.
Clemenceau may be turning in his grave now because the Georgian
campaign showed that you can trust the generals with war after all. It
is the politicians you can't trust.
Alexander Golts is deputy editor of the online newspaper Yezhednevny
Zhurnal.
26 August 2008
moscowtimes.ru
Until recently, I thought the famous quip by early 20th-century French
Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau that "war is too important to be
left to the generals" had a lot of validity. Now the South Ossetian
war has shown that even when there is an unquestionable military
victory, diplomats and politicians can turn it into a crushing defeat.
I must admit that for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Russia's army fought well despite the fact that its main
weaponry dates back to the early 1980s. What's more, the army fought
with an extremely outdated communications system and without the use
of drones, night-vision equipment or precision-guided weapons.
The conflict also demonstrated that the military top brass runs the
armed forces the same way they did in the 1970s. Its archaic structure
prevents the military from conducting joint operations between all the
branches of the armed forces under a unified command structure. The
result is that land- and air-based forces operate completely
independent of each other. It is anyone's guess why Tu-22 strategic
bombers were used for reconnaissance purposes or for the strafing of
tactical ground targets. It is also unclear why the Air Force was
unable to foil Georgian anti-aircraft systems using electronic
countermeasures; as a result, Georgia was able to shoot down a few
Russian aircraft. Moreover, military intelligence dropped the ball
when it failed to provide timely reports of Georgian troop deployment.
But at the end of the day, none of these drawbacks stopped Russian
forces from gaining an early decisive victory. And contrary to what is
widely believed, the Russian forces did not have an overwhelming
numerical superiority over the Georgian forces. Rather, Moscow sent a
few units of well-trained and battle-ready volunteers, and they played
a decisive role in the victory since they were deployed into the
battle area without any reorganization or additional mobilization.
Russia began its deployment only 12 hours after Georgia initiated its
first attacks on South Ossetia. That was a good response time,
especially if you compare it to the military's poor performance in the
first and second wars in Chechnya. In the second war, federal forces
finally pulled themselves together and began fighting only 10 days
after insurgent leader Shamil Basayev's army invaded Dagestan.
For the first time, the army conducted its operations using the Powell
Doctrine, named after Colin Powell, then-U.S. Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (although the main points were originally formulated
in the early 1980s by former U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger). According to this doctrine, heavy and decisive force
should be used right away to provide maximum superiority over the
enemy in the shortest time. In addition, it would be difficult for
truly objective military analysts to fault Russian forces for
destroying Georgia's most important military targets deep inside its
territory. These were necessary steps to disrupt Georgia's supply
lines and to prevent regrouping of enemy forces.
But a successful military campaign ended up being a political
catastrophe for Russia, which now finds itself completely isolated by
the international community. The level of isolation is not unlike when
the Soviet Union was ostracized in 1983 after its fighter jets shot
down a South Korean airplane full of passengers. In answer to the
condemnation that Russian has received from all sides, propagandists
on state television ask: "Has Russian done anything wrong? Didn't NATO
send troops into Yugoslavia without a mandate from the international
community? And didn't the United States do the same thing in Iraq?"
The West has never been this united against Moscow's aggressive, neo-
imperial foreign policy. But this has been building up for years,
based largely on the inflammatory rhetoric of Russia's top leaders.
Remember, for example, how then-President Vladimir Putin's repeatedly
threatened the West with "asymmetric" responses -- for example, aiming
the country's missiles at Poland, the Czech Republic and Ukraine in
response to NATO expansion and the planned deployment of elements of a
U.S. missile-defense system in Europe. In addition, there were those
ridiculous media leaks about refueling Russian strategic bombers in
Cuba and the threat from a top military leader to deploy Iskander
missiles in the Kaliningrad region. And don't forget Putin's
incendiary speech in Munich in 2007.
It is particularly noteworthy that only Cuba, Syria, Belarus (albeit
with some hesitation at first) and a few other countries have
supported Russia's military response in Georgia. Neither China nor
India supported the Kremlin, even though Moscow defended their
interests at the most recent Group of Eight summit in Japan. And it is
clear why they remain silent. They have "problem territories" of their
own and intend to retain the right to act as they choose in them
without fear of foreign interference.
To put it bluntly, the Georgian campaign was a complete and total
failure of Russian diplomacy. Moscow's current isolation is the
inevitable result of having developed over the last few years its hard-
nosed, provocative stance against the West.
Clemenceau may be turning in his grave now because the Georgian
campaign showed that you can trust the generals with war after all. It
is the politicians you can't trust.
Alexander Golts is deputy editor of the online newspaper Yezhednevny
Zhurnal.